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Abstract:  The goal of this paper is to examine whether IMF lending programs in the 
MENA region lead international lenders to perceive lower lending risks and generate 
moral hazard as reflected in a shift in the maturity composition of international debt 
toward long-term debt flows. We find that IMF credit in general generated moral 
hazard in MENA after the IMF large-scale rescue package to Mexico. 
  
The goal of this paper is to examine whether the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
lending programs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region lead, ceteris paribus, 
international lenders to perceive lower lending risks and generate moral hazard. Such moral 
hazard is reflected in a shift in the maturity composition of international debt toward long-term 
debt flows. The hypothesis we investigate is whether lenders’ perceptions about risk improve, 
tilting the maturity composition of lending in favor of long-term debt as the result of IMF 
involvement and the expectation of a bailout at times of crisis. Normally when lenders’ 
perceptions about default risk improve, they would tend to increase the overall level of lending 
and lengthen the maturity of lending. If expectations of an IMF bailout reduce investors’ risk 
perceptions and generate an increase in the maturity of international loans, then such reaction 
could reasonably be used as a measure for the existence of moral hazard. The alternative 
hypothesis is that expected IMF lending does not distort investors’ perceptions of risk and 
therefore does not have a significant impact on the maturity composition of international debt. 
The examination of the IMF-induced moral hazard hypothesis is a key component in the 
debate on international financial architecture reforms. Alternatives to the large-scale IMF rescue 
packages, such as the inclusion of collective action clauses and universal debt rollover options to 
loan contracts, and empowerment of IMF to impose a standstill on payments, have been 
suggested in different fora with the objective of reducing the frequency and severity of financial 
crises and apparent investors’ moral hazard. 
This paper contributes to the literature on IMF-induced moral hazard in three ways. We 
examine for the first time in this literature the moral hazard question from the perspective of the 
maturity composition of international debt.  Second we allow for the differential moral hazard 
impacts of the various types of IMF lending programs.[1] Third we examine the MENA region, 
which hardly attracted attention in the empirical literature. The importance of examining this 
region stems from the large external finance needed to support growth and development. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief literature review 
of the literature on IMF catalytic effects and IMF-induced moral hazard. Section II discusses 
IMF lending to the MENA region. Section III discusses the hypothesis, estimation methodology, 
the empirical model, and data sources. Section IV presents the empirical results. We close with 
conclusions. 
  
I. Literature Review 
To set our research question in the proper context it is desirable to discuss two 
interrelated strands of the empirical literature on the IMF. The first is the IMF catalytic effects 
literature, which examines the effect of IMF lending on capital flows. The second is the IMF-
induced moral hazard literature, which argues that IMF lending reduces risk perception mainly 
among investors and generates moral hazard. 
The focus of the IMF catalytic effects literature is whether IMF lending catalyzes private 
capital flows, which are needed to cover the external finance needs of countries undertaking 
macroeconomic and structural adjustment. The catalysis stems from the informational role of the 
IMF and the liquidity that IMF programs provide (Rodrick 1995; Bird and Rowlands 2000). In 
addition, by agreeing to an IMF program the government can signal its commitment to economic 
reform.  Bird and Rowlands (2000) argue that by putting at stake own resources, the IMF would 
improve the quality of adjustment advice. IMF lending achieves some risk-sharing function at 
the same time it helps reduce the financing gap in program countries. Private markets can 
respond positively to the liquidity and commitment factors resulting in positive catalytic effects. 
The IMF catalytic effects have received mixed support in the empirical literature. Some 
studies have found that the presence of significant catalytic effects depends on whether private 
lending is a substitute or a complement to IMF lending (Joyce 1992; Bird 1994 and 1995). The 
evidence however leans towards IMF lending being a substitute for private capital flows (Faini et 
al 1991; Killick 1995), and therefore IMF lending does not generate significant catalytic effect. 
One important issue that the IMF catalytic effects literature failed to address is 
the influence of IMF lending on the maturity composition of capital flows, in 
particular short-term lending flows. Short-term lending matters because it is a major 
contributing factor to the Mexican and East Asian financial crises of the second half 
of the 1990s and is important if we want to avert similar crises in the MENA region. 
We focus on the maturity composition of international capital flows in this paper. 
In the IMF-induced moral hazard literature, IMF lending has been criticized for its moral 
hazard impact on international financial markets. Calomiris (1998), for example, have argued 
that IMF programs have led to moral hazard with less prudent policies of risk taking by lenders 
during the Mexican and Asian crises. 
The empirical literature on moral hazard has focused on the existence of distortions in the 
pricing of credit to emerging economies. These studies have mainly examined whether IMF 
lending lowers risks to lenders and reduces bond spreads. Zhang (1999), Lane and Phillips 
(2000), and Kamin (2001) found evidence that bond spreads in emerging markets increase 
following crises in which IMF extended crisis lending, which yields no support to the IMF-
induced moral hazard hypothesis. In contrast, Dell’Ariccia, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer (2002) 
found that by not supporting Russia’s government after the 1998 crisis the IMF sent a signal to 
international financial markets that lenders will not be bailed out, resulting in an increase in the 
level and the cross-country dispersion of spreads. 
None of the above studies, however, has analyzed the potential differential impact of the 
various IMF programs on moral hazard. These programs differ in their objectives, conditionality, 
country eligibility, and terms of borrowing. 
  
II. IMF Lending to the MENA Region 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is comprised of fourteen countries 
which are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. This classification follows the World Bank’s Global 
Development Finance (GDF) regional classification. Although GDF classifies Turkey under 
Europe and Central Asia, in this paper we classify Turkey also as a MENA region country, 
bringing the number of MENA countries to fifteen. 
Out of the fifteen countries, the IMF extended programs to seven countries during 1992-
97: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen. In this paper we exclude 
Algeria because of the political problems the country experienced in the 1990’s, which might 
influence our estimation results. 
The IMF has provided regular lending to these six countries in the form of either Stand-
By Arrangements (SBA) or extended arrangements (see Table 1). Out of the six countries, five 
countries had SBAs with the IMF.  Turkey obtained by far the largest SBA credit in the region in 
1994 amounting to SDR 611 million or about $880 million. However, relative to GDP, this IMF 
credit amounted to one half of one percentage point of GDP, one of the lowest in the region. On 
the other hand, Yemen obtained IMF credit, which amounted to about 4 percent of its GDP, 
which relative to GDP is the largest in the region. Given the limited access of many countries in 
the MENA region to international capital markets, we think it is quite appropriate to interpret the 
size of SBA credit relative to GDP as an indicator of the size of the economic problem the 
country faces. 
One interesting observation about SBA lending to the MENA countries is that the 
commitment to economic reform, as reflected by the percentage of withdrawn resources to the 
agreed credit, is positively related to the relative size of SBA and therefore the size of the 
economic problem. 
Jordan and Yemen had extended arrangements with the IMF subsequent to their SBAs. 
Jordan had two extended arrangements starting 1994, each amounting to 5 percent of GDP and 
were about triple the size of the SBA credit the country obtained between 1992 and 
1994. Similarly for Yemen the credit size of the extended arrangement was more than double 
that of its SBA. 
In the case of Egypt’s SBA and extended arrangements, no withdrawal took place, which 
could be explained in terms of the Egyptian government’s desire to only get the IMF’s seal of 
approval for its macroeconomic policies and use perhaps cheaper sources of financing. Note that 
during that period, Egypt accumulated foreign exchange reserves that reached about $18 billion 
in 1998, and therefore was not in dire need for foreign exchange. 
  
            III. Hypothesis, Estimation Methodology, Empirical Model and Data Sources 
A. Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of interest is whether IMF lending induces moral hazard that takes the 
form less short-term debt flows relative to total debt flows. We test for the presence of IMF 
lending induced moral hazard by comparing the effects of different expected IMF lending 
programs on short-term debt flows relative to total debt flows before and after a major IMF 
rescue package. By using expected IMF lending programs we appropriately model the 
relationship between private capital flows and IMF lending in which the former lead the latter in 
anticipation of bailouts. 
            Empirically, we will compare the effect of IMF lending on the maturity of international 
debt flows in the period following the Mexican crisis and the associated IMF rescue package to 
the pre-crisis period. We select the Mexican crisis because it was the first large-scale spending 
program, which the IMF extended in the 1990s. Our approach is similar to that in Dell’Ariccia, 
Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer (2002), Lane and Phillips (2000), and Kamin (2001). 
  
B. Estimation Methodology 
            Because it is likely that borrowing country characteristics influence short-term capital 
flows, we use a one-way error component model to account for those factors in the empirical 
model (Hsiao 1986; Baltagi 1995). The decision to treat the effects as a fixed or random effects 
model is based on Hausman’s specification test. 
  
C. Empirical Model 
The empirical model that we estimate is given by 
          STDi t  =  + GDPi, t-1 + DEBTi, t-1 + INSTDELTAi, t-1 + DEFICITi, t-1 + OPENi, t-1 
            + CREDITi, t-1 + IMFi, t+1 + WITHDRAWNi, t+1 + uit          
            
The dependent variable STD is the net flows of short-term foreign debt as a 
percentage of total external debt net flows, GDP is real GDP in billions of US 
dollars, DEBT is total external debt in billions of US dollars, INSTDELTA is the 
change in investors’ perceptions about the institutional environment, OPEN  is the 
degree of openness of the economy, CREDIT is private credit as a percentage of 
GDP, IMF is the IMF agreed program credit as a percentage of GDP, 
and WITHDRAWN is the withdrawn IMF program credit as a percentage of program 
credit, and u is a  composite error term. 
The IMF variables IMF and WITHDRAWN are led one period ahead to account 
for investors’ expectations of IMF lending and the country commitment to economic 
reform. The remaining explanatory variables constitute the economic fundamentals 
that may affect the maturity of international loans. These variables are lagged one 
period to allow for the fact that the changes in loan maturity this period may reflect 
the fundamentals at the end of the previous period. These variables are similar to 
those used by Rodrick and Velasco (1999). [2] 
            The dependent variable, STD, measures the importance of the short-term debt 
flows relative to total debt flows. Riskier countries, other things being equal, are 
expected to attract relatively more short-term debt flows.  GDP accounts for the level 
of economic activity in the economy. Economies with higher GDP levels are expected 
to attract a lower proportion of short-term debt flows. DEBT accounts for the overall 
level of indebtedness of the country. We expect to find positive relationship between 
short-term debt flows and the level of total debt; ceteris paribus, as total debt 
increases, default risk increases and therefore the relative importance of short-term 
debt flows would also increase. INSTDELTA are proxied by the change in the rule of 
law and captures changes in investors’ perceptions about default risk and, ceteris 
paribus, is expected to lead to an increase in the relative share of short-term debt 
flows. OPEN is an indicator of the ability of a country to purchase foreign reserves in 
the economy. Therefore a higher degree of openness of the country lowers its default 
risk. Even if the economy does not have current account surplus, a more open 
economy is more integrated into the world economy, has better access to international 
capital markets, and is less likely to default on international debt than a less open 
economy. Hence, ceteris paribus, more open economies attract in relative terms less 
short-term debt flows and more long-term debt flows. Therefore, we expect to find a 
negative relationship between the degree of openness and the relative importance of 
short-term debt flows. 
            CREDIT accounts for the degree of financial development in the economy. 
The more financially developed the country, the more likely it will be able to attract a 
higher proportion of long-term loans. Therefore we expect a negative sign for the 
estimated coefficient for CREDIT. IMFaccounts for investors’ expectations of IMF 
liquidity provided under a rescue package. The expectations of an IMF program 
increase the perceived chances of bailout, improve risk perceptions and therefore 
result in a shift toward relative more long-term loans.  In the regressions below we use 
two specifications of this variable. One specification does 
not distinguish between the different IMF programs and aims to capture the overall 
lending effect of IMF programs. The other specification makes such distinction and 
aims at capturing the program specific effects.  
WITHDRAWN accounts for investors’ expectations about the country’s commitment to 
economic reform program agreed with the IMF. If lenders expect that the country is committed 
to the economic reform program, then country will be able to withdraw the available IMF 
program resources, and there will be the expectation that the country fundamentals will improve 
and therefore it will be safer to increase the maturity of the loans. 
  
D. Data Sources 
            We construct a balanced panel data set for the six MENA countries discussed above for 
the period 1992-1997.  The data set is drawn from three main sources. The first is the history of 
IMF lending arrangements available from the IMF website, which provides data on IMF lending 
arrangements and the amount of credit withdrawn. The second is Global Development Finance, 
which provides data on debt flows. The third is he International Country Risk Guide, which 
provides data on political risk, including the rule of law component. We use the rule of law to 
proxy for investors’ perceptions about the institutional environment. The rule of law is defined as 
"…the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions 
to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes."  The variable ranges from 0 to 6. Lower 
scores indicate "a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims." 
Upon changes in government, new leaders "may be less likely to accept the obligations of the 
previous regime." Higher scores indicate "sound political institutions, a strong court system, and 
provisions for an orderly succession of power." 
  
IV. Empirical Results 
Hausman specification test suggests the appropriateness of the random effects 
model. Table 2 presents the empirical results from different specifications of the 
estimation equation. The first specification includes the effect of IMF lending in 
general. The other two specifications are for SBAs and Extended Arrangements. 
Based on the Wald test statistic, we fail to reject the hypothesis that all slope 
parameters are equal to zero for the SBA and Extended Arrangements specifications. 
Thus the focus of this section is on the effect of IMF lending in general. 
The effect of IMF lending in general was statistically insignificant in the pre-crisis 
period. In the post-crisis period, however, IMF lending seems to have reduced lending risk and 
therefore relative short-term debt flows. An increase in IMF credit by 1 percentage point resulted 
in a reduction in short-term lending flows by about 7 percentage points. Since we control for the 
total level of debt and economic fundamentals, we conclude that IMF lending in general 
introduced some measure of moral hazard in international lending in the MENA region during 
the post-crisis period. 
            The level of real GDP appears to have lowered risk in the pre-crisis period 
leading to a reduction in the relative role of short-term debt. However, higher levels of 
real GDP led to the opposite result in the post-crisis period. An increase in the level of 
total external debt, ceteris paribus, increased relative short-term debt flows because of 
the increase in lending risk. The coefficient multiplies in sign in the post crisis period, 
which suggests that the Mexican crisis worsened risk perceptions among 
investors. Improvement in investors’ perceptions about institutional development, on 
the other hand, reduced relative short-term debt flows, a result consistent with the 
results of Mina (2002). This result is interesting and opens up the door for further 
investigation about the influence of institutional factors on capital flows and how 
these factors are related to default risk. 
            Fiscal deficit increased relative short-term debt flows in the post-crisis period 
since larger deficits increase default risk, ceteris paribus. Comparing the sign and 
coefficient size to those for the pre-crisis period, this result seems to confirm our 
interpretation that investors’ risk perceptions worsened in the post-crisis period. The 
degree of financial reduced relative short-term debt flows in the post-crisis period. 
  
V. Conclusion 
            In this paper we have examined the issue of whether IMF lending generates 
moral hazard in the MENA region through its effects on the maturity composition of 
international debt flows. The importance of the maturity of international debt stems 
from the significant role that short-term capital flows played in the 1990’s 
international financial crises.  We found that IMF lending programs in general tend to 
reduce short-term debt flows relative to total debt flows especially in the post 
Mexican crisis period and therefore generate moral hazard. 
              
Endnotes 
  
1.        For an examination of the effects of IMF programs on the access to international capital 
markets, see for example, Bird and Rowlands (1997, 1999a, 1999b, and 2000), Bird, Mori, 
and Rowlands (1999). For an examination of the effects of IMF programs on the cost of 
borrowing, see for example Eichengreen and Mody (2000 and 2001). These authors discuss 
the signaling and commitment effects of IMF programs in examining the effect on countries 
access to international bonds markets, but do not empirically examine these effects nor 
separate them by IMF programs. 
  
2.        In examining the determinants of extended debt maturity Rodrick and Velasco (1999) use 
income per capita in log form, the ratios of M2, external debt, and imports to GDP, and a 
corruption index. 
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TABLE 1-- IMF LENDING PROGRAMS FOR THE MENA COUNTRIES 
  
  Date of arrangement 
Expiration or 
cancellation date 
Agreed IMF credit 
(millions of  SDR) 
IMF credit 
withdrawn 
(millions of 
SDRs) 
IMF credit 
(percent 
of GDP) 
Withdrawn 
credit 
(percent of 
agreed 
credit) 
Stand-by arrangements 
Egypt Oct-96 Sep-98 271.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 
Yemen Mar-96 Jun-97 132.4 132.4 3.7 100.0 
Turkey Jul-94 Mar-96 610.5 460.5 0.5 75.4 
Jordan Feb-92 Feb-94 44.4 44.4 1.2 100.0 
Morocco Jan-92 Mar-93 91.9 18.4 0.4 20.0 
       
Extended arrangements 
Yemen Oct-97 Oct-01 72.9 46.5 1.7 63.8 
Jordan Feb-96 Feb-99 238.04 202.52 5.3 85.1 
Jordan May-94 Feb-96 189.3 130.32 4.5 68.8 
Egypt Sep-93 Sep-96 400.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 
Tunisia Jul-88 Jul-92 207.3 207.3 2.8 100.0 
  
TABLE 2: EFFECT OF IMF PROGRAMS ON SHORT-TERM LENDING FLOWS TO THE MENA 
REGION 
Dependent Variable: STD 
  
  (1) (2) (3) 
  IMF Credit Stand-by arrangements Extended arrangements 
  1992-94 1995-97 1992-94 1995-97 1992-94 1995-97 
GDPi,t-1 -0.003*** 1.969*** -0.153* 0.244 -0.319** 0.408 
  (0.036) (0.568) (0.083) (0.261) (0.152) (0.259) 
              
DEBTi,t-1 2.424* 48.901* 8.895** -7.615 9.749** -23.347* 
  (1.314) (26.967) (4.372) (9.188) (4.581) (0.104) 
              
INSTDELTAi,t-
1 4.471 
-
984.361*** 30.705 -115.55 18.189 -802.289** 
  (12.052) (342.834) (26.714) (246.89) (33.924) (369.089) 
              
DEFICITi,t-1 -12.429*** 60.109** -20.827*** -30.089 -26.386** -118.351* 
  (2.107) (30.073) (7.532) (21.331) (11.510) (67.681) 
              
OPENi,t-1 -1.768*** 44.383*** 0.025 8.975 -3.215* -12.804 
  (0.526) (16.998) (1.330) (6.549) (1.954) (9.786) 
              
CREDITi,t-1 3.723*** -24.259*** 6.901** -20.978 11.773** -8.454 
  (1.002) (6.302) (3.016) (12.569) (5.074) (12.491) 
              
IMF 0.010 -7.024**         
  (0.052) (2.771)         
              
SBA     83.252 -522.271     
      (256.089) (352.998)     
              
Withdrawn SBA     -2.156 2.529     
      (2.742) (2.481)     
              
Extended 
arrangements         -208.024* 88.135 
          (117.159) (91.675) 
              
Withdrawn 
extended 
arrangements 
resources 
        14.713* 9.772 
          (8.244) (10.951) 
              
Constant 112.478 -5618.17*** -223.445 -200.458 115.758*** 1125.58 
  (71.650) (2183.84) (207.931) (378.623) (184.233) (1043.135) 
              
No. of Obs. 18 12 18 12 18 12 
Wald Chi 
Squared 293 43 15 11 13 16 
Notes: For the first specification, regressions are corrected for panel heteroskedasticity and within-panel 
correlation. For the second and third specifications, regressions are corrected for panel heteroskedasticity. 
  
  
  
  
 
